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From Surrogates to Storit's:

The Evolution of Federal Merg·er Policy
by Robert H. Lamie ami James Lallgellfeld

F

rom its modcrn origins more
than thirty years ago federal
merger policy has centered
around the use of standard surrogates for market power to make presumptions ahout the likely effects of
mergers. Since that time it has been evolving towards an increasingly complex
approach as economic considerations
have cxpanded their influence on merger
policy. This trend was solidified in Ihe
19X2 revision of the Departmcnt of
Justice's Merger Guidelines, accelerated
by the Department of Justice amI Federal
Tradc Commission 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines' increascd emphasis
on unilateral (as opposed to collusive)
anticompetitive effects,' and has reached
new heights in the last two years with new
unilateral theories and the application of
econometric analysis of market data and
game-theory hased simulation programs.
In effect, mcrger policy has been moving
away from rcliance on surrogates and
towards an approach that instead tclls a
story of anticompetitive harm-an
approach that directly asks ami answers
the ultimate question: are prices to consumers likely to increase as a rcsult of a
merger'? This new approach can lead to
slllprising conclusions.

The Traditiomd Approach
UllilCd SlalC,\' I'. Phi/ai/('//,hia Naliolla/
/Jallk, 374 U.S. 321 (1%3). one of the

first modern merger cases.~ held that the
government must define the rclevantmarRobl'l't II. Lallde is Prof(·s.l'lIr aT the
Ullil'l'I'sity of Ba/till/orC' School of Lilli',
alld J{l/lIl'~' UIIIRl'l!(dd i,\' Prillcipal of thl'
[,till' & EcollolI/ics Consllltillg GrollI', I
Chicago, Ill. ulIIgelifdd \l'lIS the ('COIIOII/ie expert reprC'selltillg \'{/riolls primt(' I
parties ;11 II/ost l!r the recellt trclIISlIcticms J
' cli.\'C/Iss(·cl ill this article.

L. . . _. ._.................. _. . . . . . . . ~....._ _ ......_. ____.

ket and prove appropriate market share
and market concentration data. II' the govenunent proved these surrogates for market power, the Suoreme Court was willing
to declare a PI'l':,umption of illegality that
would control unless defendant "clearly"
could overcome it. Id. at 363. Once the
government had defined the relevant market and showed an appropriate increase in
concentration, the case was virtually over
and the merger would be enjoined,'
As we have learned over the last thirty years. the traditional approach has
many problems. For example. market
definition can be an all or nothing game
and can determine whether a merger will
be challenged. Suppo;.e, for example, that
two manufacturers of luxury automobiles, such as Mercedes and BMW, want
to merge. If the "relevant market" were
considered to be "all new automobiles,'"
the merger would probably be regarded
as harmless since their market shares
would be trivial. On the other hand, if
there were such a thing as a "luxury car
markct," the merger might involve unduly high market shares and could thus be
challenged and prevented, Unfortunately.
the methods for and evidence of market
determination seldom lead to unambiguous market definitions,
Accordingly. the conventional
approach can lead to little predictability
in "heterogeneous" or "di fferentiated"
markets composed of products with substantially different features and prices.
such as automobiles. or with significant
hrand distinction and (arguably) less
obvious product differences. such as hath
tissues. This problem can be serious
because one can almost always find
enough differences in products to make
an argument that any market is heterogeneous. The traditional approach to this
problem. at least prior to the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. was to decide
how close the products of the merging

finns arc in a product market space. and
make this a qualitative "plus" or "minus"
factor in the analysis.
Another problem with Phi/adelphia
Naliolla//Jallk's presumptive approach is
that every merger involves different competitive circumstances that can affect
whether a merger is likely to reduce competition. Even if one can establish that a
merger would result in a post-merger
industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(1·11·11) over IXOO and an increase of more
than 100, these calculations by themselves seldom accurately predict whether
competition will be harmed hy the merger. For example. Ulliled SIll/Cs I'. Gellel'll/
DYllal/lic,\' Corp .• 415 U.S. 4X6 (1974),
held that current production of coal was a
poor measure of future competition and
that uncommitted coal reserves should be
uscd instead ..' Cases such as Ulliled Slall',\'
I'. !!'t/'I'le M(//wgl'lIu'III, 11Il',. 5XX F. Supp.
49X (S,D.N.Y. 19X3). /'el"d. 743 F.2d 976
(2d Cir. 19X4). recognized the imp0l1ance
of potential entry as a cheek on postmerger market power." and Ulliled Slall',\'
I'. CO/II/II:\, l..llke Foods. 1990-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH; ~169.113 (D. Minn. 1(90), highlighted the impact of powerful buyers in
counteracting increased seller concentration aner a merger.
Perhaps for these reasons, Phi/adell,hia Naliolla/ /Jallk's presumptive
approach has eroded over time, For example. in Ullited Slales I'. Mal'ille /JllI/l'OI'l'om/ioll. /1Il'" 41 XU,S. 602. 631 (1974).
the Supreme COUl1 rearticulated the formulation, hut omitted "clearly" from the
presumption. Moreover. even the word
"presumption" may now be debatable.
Recall the opinion in Ullilcd Slall's I'.
/Jakel' lIughl',\' 11Il'" 731 F. SUpp. 3
(D.D.C.). all"d, 90X F.2d 9XI (D.C. qr.
1(90), in which Judge Thomas arguall1y
abolished the presumption completely,?
although the presumption docs remain in
the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
S I' U I ,\' {;
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Recent Government Approaches
Regardless of whether a presumption still
exists under case law. the federal
enforcers today do not merely deline a
relevant market. show the relevant
market shares and HHI figures. and
rest their case. Using a variety of economic models and techniques. x federal
enforcers are attempting to develop additional information that would shed light
on whether a merger is likely to he anticompetitive."
In particular. there have heen many
recent attempts hy the Federal Trade
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Commission and the Department of
Justice to shift the focus of investigations
away from market definition. particularly in cases involving unilateral effects. III
Their approach is to return to first principles. Since the enforcers ultimately care
about the linn's ahility to raise price after
a merger. they look at a variety of factors
and try directly to predict what will happen to future industry prices.
In the extreme. this means forgetting
about market definition. market shares.
and other surrogates of market power. As
Jonathan Baker and Gregory Werden suggest in this issue of ANTITRlIST. so long
as the price of something is likely to rise.
why should we waste time figuring out
exactly what prices will go up'? To use an
example that Baker has used in the past.
there might be an extreme case when we
do not care exactly how the beer market
is defined or what the precise market
shares arc-e.g .• whether "lite" beer or
imported heel' should be included in the
relevantmarkel. " If Anheuser-Busch and
Miller were to merge and the price of
something (even if we have not defined
precisely what it is) probably will
increase. then the agencies should take
this as direct evidence of reduced competition and attempt to stop the merger.
Other antitrust scholars and practitioners. such as Wenlen in this issue.
argue that economic simulations based
on estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities of demand should be used instead
of analysis that centers around structural
surrogates. In fact. the government in its
internal deliberations frequently has used
this type of analysis to predict directly
profit-maximizing price increases.
At a minimum. this new method of
analysis means an increased focus on the
nalllre of competition between the merging finns and their close substitutes. paying par1icular attention to the likely effects
of the merger on groups of custol11ers,l~

Ideology or Improved
Economic Tools
There is concern in the defense bar that
economic story telling and the increased
focus on unilateral effects analysis will
lead to overly narrow market definitions.
or no market definition at all. Some
believe that the old BrOl\'ll Shol' submarket concept has returned. albeit disguised
by new economic Ianguage.1l or there is
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an attempt to avoid the statute's reference
to a "line of commerce."
For example. in Ullitl'd St({tl'S I'.
Il/tNstatl' Bakcrics e(1) .. Civ. Action
No.: 95C 4194 (N.D. III. filed July 20.
1995). thc government allcgcd that the
relcvant product markct was "white pan
bread bakcd by wholcsale and captive
bakeries sold through retail food stores."
ami that the mergcr "would likely cause
Interstate to raise its prices for white pan
bread sold undcr its hralld.l' and the
1)/"{1IId,I' it is acquiring from Continental
[such as Wonder or Wehers]" (emphasis
added). According to thc Department of
Justice. bread baked in stores' bakeries
was not to he includcd in the same relevant market as branded bread. and storebrand white pan bread (such as Safeway).
rolls. hearth baked. wheat. rye. diet. etc.,
hreads would be unlikely to constrain a
price increase in branded white pan
hreads after the merger.
By contrast. during the Reagan
Administration. the i'TC considered the
same market in Flo\l"('/".I' l"dll,I'triC.l', 11/("..
102 ET.C. 1700 (I9!D). but alleged "[ thc]
relevant product market for each acquisition ... is the manufacture and sale of
brcad and bread-type rolls produccd by
wholesale bakcries. grocery chain bakeries. and in-storc bakeries." wherc
"hread shall mean white. wheat. rye. dark
or variety baked bread products" and
"hread-type rolls shall mean hamburger
and hotdog rolls. brown and serve rolls.
English muffins. hearth rolls. and similar
products." Id. at 1701. 1705.
Thus. market definition and competitive analysis have shifted over the last
decade. This would be desirable if the
approach taken a decadc ago resulted in
markets that were too broad. After all. if
the government could show that a mcrger would increase the price of "branded
white bread" by 10 percent for a significant period of time. then the merger
should be enjoined.
The government's new mcthod of
analysis is. however. not inherently proplaintiff. In many ways it was originated
by (then) Posner and Landes in 19R I.I~
Posner and Landes pointed out that if it
were possible to calculate ela~icity of
supply and elasticity of demand. we could
forgo market definition and market share
because we would know everything we
needed to know to assess a merger's COI11-

('

peliti\'c impa\.:1. However. because we
cannot know this very often. we must
instead usc the traditional methods of calculating the surrogates of relevantll1arket
and market shares. and making presumptions. 15
The government's new approach is
saying. in effect. that enforcers agree with
Landes's and Posner's overall methodology, but that econoJJ1ic theory. econometric techniques. data availability.If' and
developments in computer simulations
have improved so much in the last fifteen
years. we can now often answer Landes's
and Posner's direct question. In this issue
of ANTITRUST. Werden suggests that in
those cases where we can answer the
direct question and calculate likely price
increases. we should do that. instead of
using traditional structural analysis.
In addition to its pl·ovellance. another
reason why this apprm.':h is not necessarily pro-plaintiff is that it sometimes
can be used to weigh in favor of the legality of a merger under the right circumstances. In another recent merger of two
bread bakeries. for example. one of the
bakeries specialized in pan bread. while
the other specialized in hearth bread.
After an extensive analysis. the
Department of Justice decided not to
challenge the merger hecause. among
othcr reasons. it was shown that the products of the two bakeries were not each
other's closest competitor in retail sales."
Accordingly. these recent developments may provide more bases for
challenging mergers. hut there docs
not appear to be an ideological bias
involved in the government's new
methodology.

Disadnmtllges of the Trend
The new methodologies have a number of
disadvantages. which may weigh against
their usc in spite of their lack of ideological bias and their widespread support.
First. there arc often problems with
obtaining the necessary underlying data
in a form that is of sufficient quality. IS
Second. assuming that the data arc
availahle and reliable. discussions with
the agencies often turn into a battle of the
applicahle economic assumptions. econometric analysis. and computer simulation
models. For example. is the market better
categorized as homogeneous or difTerentiated. is the firm's competition hased on
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quantity (Cournot gallle-thl~ory mmlelsl
or price (Bertrand game-theory models).
or any game theory I1llldel at all'll" What
docs one assume about the shape of the
demand curves. the grouping of products
in a demand system. and the structure of
the demand estimation process?~" What
arc the relevant time periods?~1 Which
simulation model should we use?~~ Is
product repositioning (a form of entry)
easy'?:' Virtually all of these models
always predict prices will rise as a result
of a merger without any explicitly collusive behavior (absent significant efficiencies).~-I Accordingly. what level of predicted price incro;:ase is sufticientto mcrit
challcnging a mcrgcr? Different answers
to these and other technical questions
may lead to predictions of either a de
minimis or a significant price increase
from a mergcr. so the government's
analysis risks being fragile.
Spclling out in detail the assumptions
is very useful, as long as decision makers
understand the assumptions and their
importance. However. if one can change
the analysis substantially by making fair
hut different assllmptions. or if thc analysis is based on rclatively small difTerences
in statistical estimates. the government's
approach is unlikely to be very useful.
Third. the methodology may be less
predictable than traditional market definition analysis. There is clearly uncertainty with both the 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines approach to market definition
and these recent approaches.~~ However.
faced with a client that wishes to merge
with a competitor. a defense lawyer might
be in a position of saying "it depends on
the assumptions ahout the shape of the
demand curve."
Moreover. it is not clear how often the
government will he able to l1leet its hurden of proof in court given the data and
methodological issues. The new e\.:onomic approaches being used hy the
antitrust agencies have not bcen rcally
tested in litigation. and the courts could
substantially affect thc influence thcse
new approachc~ have on mcrger policy
and analysis.~h Thus. the new unilateral
effeds analysis may lead to less husiness
certainty. with all the negatives that flow
from lower predictahility.
A fourth drawhack is that this new
analysis can he time consuming and
expensive. especiall~' when the mcrging
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parties attempt to challenge the government's analysis or attempt to usc these
appJ'l'''C !les to dissuade the agencies from
I:nallenging a merger. It can oftcn cost
hundreds of thousands of dollars to do a
complete analysis in a pal1icular case, and
the analysis moves even more from existing case law to the realm of economists.
Pmcticllllmp~,ct

on Policy

One of thc most important practical
effccts of thc govcrnment's ncw approach
is that it oftcn can find unilateral anticompetitive effects at very low combined
market shares. Jonathan Baker's article
in this issue of ANTITRUST provides an
example of how a merger can lead to a
11.5 percent price increase even though
the firms' combined market share is only
10 percent.
Thus. it should come as no surprise
that assumptions similar to those contained in the government's models can
produce many scenarios involving combined market shares of even less than 20
percent that predict price increases of
more than 10 percent. In fact. Ihis type of
analysis can predict price increases from
6 percent to ovcr 50 percent after the
merger of two finns that each have only
5 percent of a hypothetical market. Under
reasonable assumptions. the new
approach can predict significant price
increases with what most would consider small market shares.
Do the Merger Guidelines permit a
consideration of unilateral effects when
the firms' combined market shares is this
small'! Many in the antitrust hal' helieve
that the Merger Guidelines contain a general safe harbor for uni lateral effects
when the combined market shares total
less than 35 percent. hut it is clear from
Baker's analysis that many of the current
antitrust enforcers do not believe this. The
Merger Guidelines state in Sections 1.111
and 1.11 that there will be no presumption of unilateral effects if the merged
finn has less than a 35 percent market
share. but this does not necessarily mean
that a ~afe harbor exists if there is evidence that the merging finns are each
other's c\osestcompetitor.
Is challenging mergers with combined
market shares of less than 35 perceht
based on noncollusive theories consistent
with past enforcement practice'! As a
practical matter. it represents a dramatic
.\ /, H I .\'

(j

J

I}

t)

7

C

change from the Reagan-Bush years.
For example, from 1987 to 1992 the Federal Trade Commission challenged only
four mergers (out of a total of 61 challenges) that involved an HHI increase of
less than 400Y We would be surprised if
any of the challenged transactions
involved combined market shares as low
as 20 percent.
Our experience suggests that during
the Reagan years many enforcers
believed that for a firm to have the power
to unilaterally raise price and restrict output it would usually have to have more
than 50 percent of a market, and even in
those circumstances market power orten
was negated by case of entry, repositioning. contestability, etc. Now the debate
has shifted dramatically. The federal
enforcers are not only concerned with
market shares over 50 percent, but at least
some appear concerned with combined
market shares in the 20-35 percent range.
Economists differ over whether this
mirrors the real world. Many economists
continue to believe that substantial market power, when it exists at all. requires
market shares well over 50 percent."K
Others believe that market power can
begin in the 30-40 percent range."" If one
holds this latter view, the government's
new policy could be justified by the incipiency mandate of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act-depending on how far the government and courts are willing to take these
theories.

Testing the New Approach
in Court
Ever since Philadelphia Natiollal /Jallk.
merger enforcement has been moving
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away from a mechanical approach using
surrogates and presumptions towards one
that directly attempts to answer the ultimate question of whether price is likely to
increase because of a merger. This trend
has been accelerating recently. and it is
not clear how far the agencies will take it
or whether a court would ever go all the
way and forgo the use of market definition, market share. and concentration.
In the Department of Justice's failed
attempt to challenge the acquisition of
the Parker Pen Company hy the Gillette
Company, its expert economic witness
concluded that the merger was anticompetitive without including an analysis that
defined a relevant market.)11 Would a cout1
now adopt Baker's approach and conclude that the price of something is likely to rise hy 12.5 percent. so never mind
exactly what the relevant market is'! Such
an approach is contrary to long estahlished case law. such as Philadelphia
Natiollul/Jullk, which holds that it is first
necessary to define the relevant market
and caleulate market shares. And, of
course, the Merger Guidelines would
have to be amended hecause they now
assert that the government will start its
analysis by defining the relevant market.
If the government is going to test the
extreme version of its approach in court
and assert that it did not have to define the
relevant market or calculate concentration or market shares, then it should challenge a merger that is the equivalent of
Coca-Cola buying Pepsi. This is probably
the only way the government could convince a court to ignore th' traditional surrogates and find potential harm to a relatively undefined "line of commen:e."" If.

Paul T. Denis, Atll'aIlC('s (~/"Ihl' IYY2 1I0rbllllai Merga
Gltidl'lilll's ill Ihe Alloly.I'is o/"('oll/I'elilil'e J::lli'('/s, 3X ANTITRUST BIILL.

'S('(', l'.g ..

479 (1993).
, In some respects, such as requiring market delinitions, /l1'll11'1I Shol' ('0. I:
Vllill'd Slales, :\70 U.S. 294 (1962). can he considered the lirst modern
merger case.
I The list of factors that could O\'erturn tho.! clear presumption was relatively short and. in the years immediately after the decision, rarely used.
'This was the market delinition used hy the f-TC in evaluating the GMToyota joint venture in 19X4, 1m ET.C, 374 ( 19H4).
'One can also argue that the court merely disagreed with the way market
shares should he calculated, but the case docs focus on future actions rather
than on CUITent sales.
t'Set' Malcolm Coate & James Langenfeld, 1:'lIlry Vlltll'r Ihe Mager
(ll/iddille.I' /l)82-/9Y2, 3H ANTITRUST Bul.I .. 557 (11)1)3) (discussing
history of entry analysis in the courts),
8,INTITN/IST
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however, the government's analysis
hinges on an economic model that shows
a significant anticol11petitivc effect when
there is a constant elasticity demand
curve. but a straight line demand curve
prediets only a de minimis price increase,
it is unlikely that any court will hold that
the government had met its burden of persuasion. Accordingly, we would expect
that this approach would at least initially
be tested in court in conjunction with a
traditional structural analysis.

Clarifying Policy
We believe that business needs an explicit safe harbor from unilateral effects
analysis. Because a 35 percent post-merger market share does not appear to be a
safe harbor threshold, and these theories
have not yet been tested in court, the government should more clearly articulate its
standards until these theories have been
litigated. Further. because the new models almost always predict some price
increase, it also would be de~irable for
the agencies to specify what they consider an allowable (or de minimis) predicteu
price increase. This is particularly imp(,rtant because the authors' experiences suggest that the agencies have been reluctant
to accept any predicted price increase
resulting from a merger.
Descriptions of the rationale for bringing specific ca~es, such as Baker's article
in this issue, are extremely helpful.
However. it is still difficult to generalize
from this type of discussion and to provide a reasonably high level of certainty
when counseling many prospective mergers, absent extensive and expensive
analysis .•

, Judge Thomas held that despite /'hiladell'hia Naliollal /l(mk. "The ultimate hurden of persuading the tri.:r or fact, .. remains at all times with
the plaintifr, ..." !lakerlll/ghl'.l. I)OX F.2d at 1)91 (citation omillcd).
'The economic literature in this area has been dcvelopcd and relincd ol'l'r
many Yl'ars and is too extensive to discuss here. The authors or important
articles in the licld inl'lude current and ronncr Departmcntof Justice and
FTC economists. inl'luding Jonathan Baker, Luke Froeb. Thomas
Overstrcet, George Rozanski, Greg Werdcn, Carl Shapiro. and Robert
Willig. For example, this magazine has rccently published two articles on
the subject or unilateral cI'fects analy,;is, Thomas Ovcrstrcet I.'t al..
Vllder.vltmdillg 1':('(III(I//I('lric Allalysis (!f'I'rice /:'{1i'c/S oJ'Mt'lger.I'llIl'ol,·illg
f)ilfl'n'lIlialed Pl'lIdltCIS, ANTlTtWsT, Summl.'r 19')6. at 30. allli Carl
SI;;,piro. Mergers lI'ilh /Jilli'n'lIIiolt'" "mt/ltcl,l. ANTlTI{lIST. S~ring 1996,

at 2.1.
"We only discuss the price dfcc\s of mergers. Others havl.' suggestl.'d that
mergl.'r I.'nforcelllcnt should haw additional con,erns, hut these arc beyond
the 'icope of this artil'le. See Robert II. La':lle, 1I't'altll '/i'mlsfi,,..1 as Ihl'
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Origillal (/Iull'rilllllry COIII'/'I'II (1IAlllilfll.l'l: TI/I' I:'llil'il'lI<'.I' bll"I11ft'llIlioll
CllIIl/l'lIgl'd, 34 IIASTIN(;s LJ, 65, 137-40 (1I)H2),

"'It is unclear why thl! gm'l!rtlml!nt has phll:l!d a renewed emphasis on unilateral eITel·h. In pill1. it b prohably due to el'(lIIomic Iheory's inm:ased
focus on tl1\: topic andlhe agl!ncies' helief Ihat collusion or othcr forms of
wordination may eilher he unlikcly to occur in diffl!renliatcd markets or
mercly dirticult to prove ahsent evidcnce Ihal it has occurred in the past
in a market under invesligation, Th.: dirticulty of wllusion or of demonslMing it has heen highlighled hy the Supreme Court in Illl/o"" (;mlll'.
1,111. I'. 1l/llII'II (!lui II'il/illll/.WII '1ilblll'I'O COl1', 113 S, Ct. 257H ( 11)9.~),
II Jonalhan B, Baker. Product Differentiation through Space m1\1 Time: Some
Antitrust Policy Issues. Presl'ntation to the Antilrust and Trade Regulation
Commillee of Ihl! Ass'n of Ihl! Bar of Ihe Cily of N,Y, 5-7 (Feb, 6, 11)96).
"Wilh rl!specllo thl! focus Oil groups of cuslomers, Ihl! recl!nl govenllnl!nl
approadll!s follow Ihl! 1992 Horiwnlal I\krgl!r Guidelines' analysis of
markels delined hy Ihe abililY 10 price differenlly 10 dilTerelll groups of
cuslomcr, SCI'
1.12 & 1.22,
"There is lillie douhllhal Ilmll'lI Shot' was incorreclly dl!cided. hut thl! reasons lilr Ihis arl! nolnecessarily rdaled 10 its hasic approach 10 market definilion, SCI' John L. Peterman. '/1u' Ilmll'IIS/ul(' CIIII', IH J,t. & ECON.
HI (1975), In some ways, Ilmll'/l Shol"s approach 10 markel ddinilion
foreshadows Ihe more recl'nl approachl!s of I!slimaling I!laslicilies of
demand: "The oull!r houndaries of a produl'lmarkel arc dell!nnined by the
rl!asonahle inlerchangeahililY of use or 11ll' cross-c1asliciIY of dcmand
helwecn Ihe product ilsl!lf and suhslilUll!s for it." Brown Shoe Co. v,
Uniled Siales, 370 U.S, 294 (1962).
"William I.andes & RichardPosm:r. II/lIrkl'll'(I))'/'I' ill tllllilfll.l'l ('w",v, 1)4
IL\HV. L. REv,9J7 (19HI).
" /d, at 9JH. 944,
'''Thl!se dala have coml! from sources such as Nielsen's and IRl's
scanner-hased price allliquanlily dala on relail sales,
II Although Iwo producls do nolnecd 10 hI! cach olher's c10scsl t:lllnpelilors
for Ihe analysb to predicl a price increase, as l'llnsumers plan: more producls "in-helween" Ihose of Ihe merging linns. Ihis will lend 10 reduce the
magnilude of Ihe projecled price inl'rease. SCI' Shapiro, .\/11".11 nole H, The
Deparlmenl of Juslice appears willing 10 allow u merger hl'low soml! level
of projl!cled price increase (as yel undclined).
" For example. scanner data can providl! a greallkal of delailt:d pricl! and
quanlilY dala hy week, These dala an: noll' vinually always used inmcrgI!I'.S involving produl'ls sold al supennarkels and drug slorcs, such as the
hakcry mergcrs discussed aho\'!! and Ihe rccent mcrger helwel'n Kimlll'rly
Clark and SCOIt. Unilcd SI;'ICS v. Kimhcrly-Clark Corp .. 19%-1 Trade Cas,
(CCIl)~171. 405 (N,D, Tex, 19%) (conscnl dcnce). Evcn wilh Ihe availahililY of Ihese dala, however, Ihere ean hI! slill he prohlems, For example. are coupons. returns, and rehall!s accuralcly faclored in'! When scanner dala arc nol availahle, Ihere arc usually suhslanlially more prohlems
wilh ohlaining accurale price allli 111HUllily dala-although cconomisls
such as B.lker. Werdcn. and Shapiro ha\'e suggesled ways 10 infer somc of
lilt! criliL'al informalion, SCI', I',g,. in Ihis issue, Bakcr. Ullilillalli
('oll/IIt'lilil'" fl/iT!.I· '/1l1'oril'.I' ill M"/:~/'I' ;\ 1111/.1'.1 i.l', il(li'lI Ihis issuc. al 21:
Werdcn. Sill/llllllillg Llllilllll'l'I/l ('Ollll'l'lilil'l' I:'lli't'/.I.timll /)illi'l'I'lIIillll't!
l',."dllcl.I' MI'/:~l'r.l', ;,(/i'tl this issue. at 27: Shapiro, J/l1'1'I/ nole H.
'"The author of a recenl arlicle questioning the increased l'omplexity of el'Onomic Iheories quotes thl! eminl'nt Stanford gaml! thl!orisl David Kreps as
saying, "Noncooperali\'e game 111l:ory , , , has had a greal run in el'llnOIllies o\'er Ihe pasl decade or two, , , WI! (economic theorisls and e/,'onomists
more broadly) nl!cd to keep a heller sense of proportion ahoul where ami
when to usc il." John Cassidy, Thl' /ke/illl' '~/'f:'/'II"oll/il'S, NLII' YORKI'll,
De/,',:!, 19%. OIl J7. 5S,
"Any projel.'lion of price inL'l'eases after a mergl~r L'an be signiticantly
affected hy Ihe assumption that Ihl!rl! is a constanl elasticity instead of a
linl!ar dcmand curvc, A linear lkmand clll'\'e assumes that the quanlil)' of
demand will fall hy Ihe same amounl for a gi\'en dollar pricl' inL'l'ease,
regardless of Ihl! currenl le\'el of sales. That is, Ihe dl!L'I'ease in the numher of units demanded di\'ided hy a one dollar increasl! in price equals a
constanl. Constant elaslicilY of demand assumes thai there will hl' a constant p,'n'I'IIllIgl' dl!L'fl!asl! in Ihe quantity demand for a gi\'en/ll'l'I'I'lIltlgl'
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increase in pricl!. In general, Enear demand curves lead 10 prl'dictions of
smaller price incn:ases thanl'llnsl,1II1 elasticity dl'mallli curves, Morl!oVl!r.
the grouping of products inlo like calegoril!s prior to the economelric
analysis frequently affects eslinwles of how dosely products competl!. In
fact. whl'ther the econometric analysis dirl'l'lly eSlimates the c1aslil'ily of
demand or docs Ihis indirectly Ihrough the impaci of price on markel
sharl!s can also greally affect the results,
" Elasticily and linn heha\'ior can also vary greatly ovcr lime, so it is 1,'111cial to choose Ihc timl! period l'IllTt'l'lly.
"Allernaliw simulalion 1Il0deis can giVl! suhslanlially dilTl!rent results,
C(lIIIIIIII'I' Gregory J. Wl!rden & Lukl! M. Froeh, Sill/llll1lioll 11.1' till
AIII'flllllil'I' 10 Slrlll'llIl'IIl MagI'/' 1'0lil'Y ill [)WI'rI'IIlitlll'd I'rodllcts
11II11I.writ'.\'. ill COMI'L'lTt ION POUCY ENIOH('I,~II'NT: TilE ECONOMICS

01' TilE ANTITRUST PHOCESS (Malm1rn CoatI! & Andrew Kldl I!ds,.
1996), lI'ilh JelTY Iiallsman cI aI., ('oll/pl'lilil'I' ""tlIY.l'i.I' Idlh [)ifli'r..lllillll'd
l'mdllcl.\'. 34 ANNAI.ES IJ'E(,ONOMII' ET Ill' STATISTI()lll' 159 (11)1)4).
"For I!xampk, if we arc worried aboul a ml!l'!!er of twol'ounlry and wl!slI!rn radio slalions, how difficult would il he for a c1assiL'al radio station to
rqlOsition ilsdf and enler Ihe counlry ami wl!sll'rn nichl''! Although the
11)1)2 1I0riwniai I\krger Guidelinl!s would presumahly treat Ihis as
"uncommitled" entry, and therefore il would he part of the agencil!s' burden of proof in market detinition, "Ihe agency staffs frequenlly Iry
to place Ihe hurden of proof on thl! advocales of Ihl! merger to show Ihal
, , , other products should hl' included in the markel share cail:ulations."
James Langl'nldd, nil' MI'/:~l'r (illidl'/illl',1 m "I'plil,t!, ill Kleit & Coale,
.1111'/'11 notl! 22, at 41, 46, The recent approadles make this analysis evcn
morc l'rilical, and there is ongoing research on Ihis issue. SI'I' Gregory
Werden & Luke Froeh, nil' 1,'III/,r-/III/II";IIg J;fli ... I.I' 1~(Ilori;ollllllllll'/:~I'I',I,
Paper Prl'sellled OIl thl! AlIlerican Economic Association Mel!ting,~, Nl'll'
Orleans, La. (Jan, IIN7).
"These models predici prices will inlTeasl! as Ion!: as Ihere is at least soml!
suhstilulahililY hetll'een Ihe products of the merging linns (a positive
cross-elaslil'ily of demand),
" Atlorneys or husinesspeople mighl have prohkms delining an anlilrusl
market without exlensiw analysis. hUI mighl haw a good idea ahoul
which l'Illllpanil!s arc their dosesll'Ompetitors. Under these conditions, il
is nol cll!ar whl!lhl!r Ihe Jl)l}:! 1I0rilOniai Merger Guidelines or thl! new
approach would creall! more uncl'rlainly,
", Onl' case thai has grappled in delail with some of Ihese issues is Nt'\!, lil/'k
\'. /\/'IIli (;1'11, /-ilod.l', /111' .• 926 F. SUpp. 321 (S.D,N,V. 11)1)5).
" Alan A. Fisher & Rohert II. Landl" Proposing a Stl1lctured Rl!lilflnulation
of Ihe Comparatively Unpredictahle 199:! Merger Guidelines, Paper
Presenled Ikfore the ABA Anlitrust Sl'l,tion Annual Meeting 7-H (Aug.
ID, 11)92), Only onl! of these challenges involved an 11111 inneasl! of kss
than JOO. II is un dear whether any of thosl! four challenges involved unilaleral effects analysis.
"SI'I' DENNIS CARLTON & JU'TIU,y PI'Hl.lll+, MOIlERN INlllISlIll,\1.
OIHiANIZAI'ION HOJ (11)1)·,),
'" S.... John E. Kwoka . .II'.. nil' /:'!li't'I 4 Mllrkl'l Shllrl' lJiS/rilmlioll
11II11I,11n' 1'I'I:li"""IIIII'I', 61 REV, E(,ON. & STAT, I. Illi (1979).

Oil

", Uniled Siaies I'. Gillelle Co., I()9J-1 Trade Cas, (CCII) ~ 70,21 II (D.C. Cir.
1l)1).~) (Cieorgl! A. RO/anski, Dedaralion in Ihe proposed al:quisilion of the
Parker Pen Company hy Illl' Ciillelll! Company).
" By analogy, the alh:mpled monopoli/alion standard in Ihe Ninth Circuil
used 10 he similar 10 what some el'llnomisls and gOI'CrlllIlenl oflicials arc
considering in thl! merger area. Lessig v, Tidl!water Oil Co, •.~ 17 F.:!d 459
(l)th Cir,), 1'/'1'1. dl'IIil'd, 3'!.7U,S.I)I)J (1 1)64) (inl'el1ain cases market definition is "nol an issue"), Many Shennan Arl I cases do nol appear to
require plainliff to prow a Idevant markel and market shall" or markel
l'oncentralion. As the COlll't noled in SIII'I'I,.,,11/ Sp"rl.I, /111'. I'. MC{!lIiI/IIII,
IUS, CI. HH4 (19(H), howel'Cr, "single linn aClivity is unlike l'oncel1ed
al·ti\,ity cOl'ered hy I, which inherently is fraughl with anticompelilil'l'
risk, For Ihese reasons, '2 makes the L'Onduct of a single linn unlaw~1
only when it actually monopoli/es or dangerously threalens to do so," Id,
ilt XI)'2 (citalion onlilled), We heliel'C Ihal mergl!r analysis hasl!d on unilaleral anlil'llmpetitil'l! effects is more analogous to monopoli/ation analysis than to I analysis,
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ANNOUNCING the new FOURTH edition

Antitrust Law
Developments
(Fourth)

XTENSIVELY REVISED. rewritten. and expanded in all subject areas. the fourth edition
of Antitrust Law Developments encompasses the many decisional and administrative
developments - including 1.350 cases
and five sets of government enforcement
guidelines - since publication of the third edition
in 1992. Replacing the earlier edition and supplements. the fourth edition covers decisions through
1996.

With nearly 1.400 pages of text in two volumes
and 8.700 footnotes (compared with 1.166 pages
and 7.300 notes in the third edition) and over
20.000 citations to more than 7.500 cases. the
fourth edition remains the most comprehensive
and current desktop review of antitrust law and
procedures available.

relevant markets. joint ventures. and exemption
and immunities. formerly parts of other chapters.
are given greatly expanded attention in their
own chapters. and the health care and sports
industries are now covered.
Appendices include the pertinent texts of the five
sets of government enforcement guidelines issued
since 1992. Also included is a table of cases. a
thorough index. and a detailed table of contents.
1997 _ 1,876 pages _ 7xl0 hardbound - 2 volumes
PC: 5030293

Treatments of all subjects have been expanded.
many chapters have been reorganized. and new
subject areas have bf!en added. For example.

Price: $295 (single copy); $275 (2-5 copies);
$250 (6+ copies)

_______ .______ copies of Antitrust Law Developments (Fourth)
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